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Abstract
This paper introduces a model of litigation in a growth framework. Investors use
litigation to enforce their nancial contracts with entrepreneurs. A contest ensues
in which both agents hire lawyers to increase their probability of winning the trial.
The issue and the cost of the contest determine how much investors are willing
to lend. More lawyers are hired when judicial eciency is lower and damages are
higher. Higher judicial eciency and tighter restrictions on the supply of lawyers
benet the economy, while the impact of higher damages is ambiguous. Some
empirical evidence is also presented.
1 Introduction
Lawyers and litigation are often blamed for diverting resources from productive to-
wards redistributive activity, and thus for harming the economy. Some empirical evidence
is consistent with this claim: Magee et al. (1989) and Murphy et al. (1991) document
negative correlations between the number of lawyers and law graduates per country and
economic growth. This theory, however, is dicult to reconcile with the other theory
according to which eective contract enforcement institutions are benecial for the econ-
omy (North, 1990). Lawyers are indeed necessary to make litigation work, and litigation
is necessary to enforce contracts. This apparent contradiction calls for a better under-
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standing of the links between contract enforcement, litigation, and the economy, which
is the objective of the paper.
One natural way to relate litigation to the economy is to think of a creditor wary of
lending to a debtor because he fears the latter may run away with the money. Examples
of such situations include bankruptcy fraud or shareholder expropriation. The possibility
of litigation oers creditors a remedy to recover their money. The eciency of this remedy
inuences the amount and the price at which creditors are willing to lend, and thus the
economy.
Litigation is ecient if it is cheap, if innocent defendants are acquitted and guilty ones
convicted. Several factors, however, make litigation inecient: First, when judges render
a decision, they rely on evidence gathered by biased lawyers whose objective is not to
establish the truth but to maximize their payo. Second, the demand for lawyers depends
partly on the number of lawyers hired by the opponent. This makes litigation look like
a contest, in which the number of lawyers hired can be ineciently high. Both agents
could keep their payo from litigation constant by hiring fewer lawyers. Third, judges
may be more or less competent and courts may be overly procedural. These ineciencies
increase the cost of enforcing contracts and curb lending.
Inecient litigation also aects directly the economy. Final-good producers compete
with law rms over a limited stock of human capital. If the number of lawyers can be
ineciently high, then the number of engineers or businessmen, and thus production, can
be ineciently low. In the United States, the number of lawyers is of the same order of
magnitude as the number of engineers, close to one million. Given that the number of
lawyers per capita in the United States is twice higher than in Germany and thirty times
higher than in Japan, this eect may be sizeable.
To better understand the interactions between these various mechanisms, the paper
embeds a model of litigation (Katz, 1988) in a growth framework (Diamond, 1965).
Predictions on the number of lawyers, nancial, and economic development as a function
of the legal environment are obtained. In the model, three parameters dene the legal
environment: the amount of damages awarded by courts, judicial eciency (competence
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of judges, formalism of courts), and possible restrictions on the supply of lawyers.
First, the model predicts that the demand for lawyers increases with the level of
damages and decreases with judicial eciency. Intuitively, higher damages increase the
stakes of the contest and thus increase the resources spent into the contest. Higher judicial
eciency by contrast is equivalent to a more competent referee. As a consequence, it
becomes less protable for the party in the wrong to spend resources in the contest. The
other party also responds by spending less as he now expects to ght a less aggressive
opponent. The paper presents a new data set consisting of the number of lawyers in 74
countries around 2004. Consistent with these predictions, the empirical evidence shows
a negative relationship between the number of lawyers and several indicators of judicial
eciency.
The debtor and the creditor form expectations on the issue of a possible contest when
they sign the nancial contract. The creditor is willing to lend more when the quality of
contract enforcement (the probability of convicting guilty debtors) is higher and when the
cost of enforcement (total spending on lawyers) is lower. Then, higher judicial eciency
increases nance because it increases the quality and decreases the cost of enforcement.
Higher damages, by contrast, increase both the quality and the cost of enforcement and
thus have an ambiguous impact on nance.
The legal environment aects economic development through two channels. First,
through nance, that has a positive impact on the economy. Second, through the number
of lawyers, who aect the cost for the nal-good sector of hiring engineers. In the model,
higher judicial eciency unambiguously benets the economy because it decreases the
number of lawyers and increases nance. Higher damages increase the number of lawyers
and have an ambiguous impact on nance. The overall impact of higher damages on
economic development is still ambiguous.
Should the supply of lawyers be limited? In some countries, law departments have only
recently been introduced in universities or the bar exam can be made more restrictive.
Tighter restrictions on the supply of lawyers increase the wage of lawyers but, as less
lawyers are hired, the eect on the total cost of litigation is nil in this simple model.
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Restricting the number of lawyers also reduces the wage of engineers. The overall eect
of a lower cap on the supply of lawyers on the economy is thus positive.
We are now in a position to answer our initial puzzle. How can we reconcile the
idea that lawyers are harmful for the economy with the idea that they are necessary
to make litigation and thus contract enforcement work. In the model, a better quality
of contract enforcement does benet the economy and lawyers do make litigation work.
The technology of litigation is such, however, that lawyers defending parties in the wrong
waste the productive eort of lawyers defending parties in the right. As a consequence, a
larger number of lawyers means a higher cost of enforcement but not necessarily a better
quality of enforcement. This implies less nance, more expensive engineers, and thus less
production.
Sections 2 and 3 lay out the economic and legal foundations of the model. The optimal
nancial contract is solved in Section 4. The impact of the legal system on the economy
is analyzed in Section 5. Section 6 presents some empirical evidence. Section 7 concludes.
1.1 Related Literature and Contribution
This paper is part of a recent eort to integrate more micro-founded legal systems
into economic models. Along these lines are the works of Gennaioli (2009) and Gennaioli
and Perotti (2009), with a focus on the impact of judges' personal biases and limited
expertise on the form of contracts; The impact of corrupted judges on contracting is
considered in Bond (2009); Anderlini et al. (2010) compare the impacts on economic
growth of case law and statute law; Massenot (2010) studies the role of adversarial and
inquisitorial legal systems on the economy. By contrast, this paper focuses on the role of
the litigation environment on the economy. These previous papers are to be contrasted
with the literature on investor protection and limited enforcement, that considers law as
a black box. In this literature, law is modelled exogenously as a monetary punishment
and/or a probability of detection. One reference on economic growth is Castro et al.
(2004), who nd that better investor protection has two opposing eects on economic
growth: It makes entrepreneurs more credit-worthy but the resulting increase in the
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interest rate reduces future capital accumulation.
The empirical part of this paper documents relationships between the number of
lawyers per country per capita and indicators of economic activity. Magee et al. (1989)
documented the same relationship in the 1980s for 35 countries while my data set contains
74 observations for 2004. Murphy et al. (1991) reported correlations between the number
of law college graduates and economic growth. This approach has the advantage of a
greater data availability as their data set contains more than 90 observations. Their focus
is, however, dierent, as they are interested in measuring the allocation of individuals in
dierent activities while I am interested in measuring litigation activity.
The paper also documents the relationship between dierent legal variables and the
number of lawyers. The only paper I am aware of that documents such a relationship is
Buonanno and Galizzi (2010). Using an instrumental variable approach, they nd a causal
link from the number of lawyers to the number of trials in Italian provinces. By contrast,
I focus on cross-country data and document correlations with various characteristics of
the legal system, albeit not the number of trials.
Finally, the assumptions and the results of this paper are consistent with a number
of criticisms against lawyers that have appeared in the legal literature. According to
Galanter (1993), critics of lawyers portray them as \corrupters of discourse, fomenters
of strife, betrayers of trust, and economic predators". It should be noted, however, that
lawyers are no dierent from other economic agents in the model of this paper. As a
consequence, this paper suggests that the structure of litigation, and not the lawyers
themselves, is to be held responsible.
2 The Economic Environment
There is a sequence of discrete time periods. At each period, there are overlapping
generations of individuals who live for two periods. Each generation is of xed size L.
There are two goods in the economy: capital k and nal good y. Capital is used to
produce the nal good and can be stored. The nal good is used as numeraire or for
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consumption. When they are young, individuals supply inelastically their unit of labor
either as lawyers or as engineers in exchange for a wage w. When they are old, some of
them become entrepreneurs and the rest become investors. Individuals are risk neutral
and consume at the end of their life. As a consequence, they save their whole labor
income s = w.
Entrepreneurs make use of the following nal-good production technology:
y = F (k; ly) = ~ak
l1 y ; (1)
where ly are engineers; ~a is a random productivity parameter that can be high (~a = a)
with probability  or low (~a = 0) with probability 1   . Engineers are hired after the
productivity is realized. The cost of hiring engineers is given by the cost function:
C(ly) = w
ly: (2)
This cost function will make it easier to solve for the equilibrium wage. It articially
decreases the marginal cost of engineers and thus aects the results quantitatively. Qual-
itative insights, however, remain unchanged.
Entrepreneurs use their savings s to nance the capital for their project. They can
borrow additional capital k   s from investors. The ensuing contract species a return r
to be repaid if the project is successful, while nothing can be repaid if the project fails. At
the time of contracting, nobody knows the productivity of the project. Once the capital
has been installed, the entrepreneur observes privately his productivity and announces it
to the investor. The problem is that the entrepreneur has an incentive to claim his project
failed even when it actually succeeded. To solve this conict of interest, the investor can
verify the realization of the productivity in court. This possibility of litigation is the only
instrument available to investors to ensure truth-telling by entrepreneurs. The litigation
process is described in the next section.
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2.1 The Demand for Engineers
The decision to hire engineers is taken once entrepreneurs have learned their produc-
tivity. The entrepreneur maximizes its expected prot for a given nancial contract and
for a given wage.
max
ly
aF (k; ly)  C(ly); (3)
The rst-order condition gives us a standard demand function for engineers decreasing
in the price:
ly =
Ak
w
; (4)
where A = ((1  )a)1=.
Once plugged into the production function of the entrepreneur, this gives:
y = (w)k; (5)
where (w) =
 
A
w
1 
.
3 The Legal Environment
The purpose of the legal system is to induce entrepreneurs to report truthfully their
productivity. It relies on courts in which parties and their lawyers can present arguments
to convince a judge of what the true state of the world is. The legal system also awards
damages to compensate victims and to punish oenders. This section presents a model
of litigation along these lines and that follows closely Katz (1988).
Consider the following scenario: An entrepreneur claims that his project failed and
the investor decides to sue him to verify his productivity. Then, both parties hire lawyers
who produce arguments according to the following production functions:
I = ln(li) (6)
E = ln(le); (7)
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where le is the number of lawyers hired by the entrepreneur, li the number of lawyers hired
by the investor, I the number of arguments found in favor of the investor, E the number
of arguments found in favor of the entrepreneur. The number of arguments increases with
the number of lawyers hired and each additional lawyer has a lower marginal productivity.
Lawyers present these arguments to a judge, who himself produces J arguments in
favor of the case of the investor. Note that no restrictions on the sign of J is imposed.
These J additional arguments may be either interpreted as the evidence collected by the
judge in civil law countries, the merits of the case, or the competence of the judge. The
entrepreneur is convicted if the number of arguments in his favor is less than the number
of arguments against him plus some error term, that is, if and only if:
I + J > E + Su; (8)
where u is an error term that follows a logistic distribution the variance of which is
proportional to S. The parameter S may be interpreted as the scrutiny in looking at the
evidence, the complexity of interpreting the arguments, or the competence of the judge
in weighing each argument.
Finally, the probability of conviction can be found by plugging Equation (8) into the
cumulative distribution function of the logistic distribution e
u
1+eu
:
X =
jli
jli + le
if the entrepreneur is guilty, (9)
with j = eJ=S. The parameter j represents a general quality of the legal system or
judicial eciency. I assume that innocent entrepreneurs are always acquitted. This nor-
malization simplies the presentation of the results without aecting them qualitatively.
The probability of conviction X takes a convenient form as it is bounded between
zero and one. It also has the following desirable properties: When judicial eciency j
increases, the probability of conviction X increases as well; When investors hire more
lawyers li, the probability of convicting the entrepreneur increases, while when en-
trepreneurs hire more lawyers le, their probability of being convicted X decreases.
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If an entrepreneur is convicted, he has to pay damages d per unit of capital to com-
pensate the investor.
To ensure the presence of litigation in equilibrium, I further assume that a proportion
p of entrepreneurs are optimistic and anticipate a zero probability of being caught even
though they are guilty. The remaining 1   p are rational and anticipate the correct
probability of being convicted. The introduction of divergent expectations ensures the
presence of litigation in equilibrium (Spier, 2007). Furthermore, entrepreneurs learn
whether they are optimistic or rational only after they hired lawyers. This assumption
simplies the presentation of the results.
3.1 Timing
The time at which lawyers are hired determines the interpretation we give to lawyers.
In reality, lawyers act both as advocates and as advisers. As advocates, they repre-
sent their clients in trials by presenting evidence or by arguing in court. As advisers,
they counsel their clients about their legal rights and obligations and suggest particu-
lar courses of action in business and personal matters. In the following timing, lawyers
are hired before the decision to litigate has been taken, that is before productivity has
been announced. As a consequence, lawyers can be interpreted both as advisers and as
advocates. This is a natural assumption because most lawyers spent little time in court.
The timing of events is as follows:
1. The nancial contract is signed.
2. Productivity is realized.
3. Lawyers and workers are hired.
4. Entrepreneurs learn whether they are optimistic or rational.
5. Entrepreneurs announce their productivity.
6. If announced productivity is low, litigation follows and evidence is produced.
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7. The judge observes the evidence presented and renders a decision.
8. If found guilty, the entrepreneur pays damages.
This particular timing has implications on the resolution of the equilibrium. Three
important decisions are to be made in this order:
1. What is the optimal nancial contract?
2. How many engineers to hire?
3. How many lawyers to hire?
As a consequence, the choice of the nancial contract is made in anticipation of the
numbers of lawyers and engineers hired. By contrast, these hiring decisions are made for
a given nancial contract.
3.2 The Demand for Lawyers
Investors and entrepreneurs choose the number of lawyers that maximize their utility
for a given wage and for a given number of lawyers hired by their opponent:
max
li
pXd  wli; (10)
max
le
 pXd  wle: (11)
The rst-order conditions of this maximization program give the reaction functions
lRj . They yield the number of lawyers that maximizes the utility of agent j = i; eas a
function of the number of lawyers hired by agent  j. Figure 1 represents these reaction
functions. They are rst increasing in the number of lawyers hired by the opponent and
then decreasing. In anticipation of a small number of lawyers, the optimal response is to
respond aggressively by hiring more lawyers. This is true until some point where parties
start playing more defensively.
The intersections of these two curves are the possible solutions of this game. There are
two solutions, rst a corner solution where entrepreneurs and investors do not hire any
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Figure 1: Reaction curves
lawyers and a second solution where they both hire a positive number of lawyers. Because
the focus of the paper is on litigation, the analysis focuses on the second equilibrium. This
is consistent with a setting in which litigation involves xed costs (because of mandatory
legal representation for example). Indeed, starting from any given strictly positive number
of lawyers hired by one of the parties, parties converge towards the interior solution.
The demands for lawyers are given by the following symmetric solution:
le(w) = li(w) =
pdj
w(j + 1)2
(12)
Then the following result holds:
Result 1 The demand for lawyers decreases with judicial eciency j and increases with
damages d.
When judicial eciency j increases, both parties \ght" less because they expect that
the judge is more likely to nd out the truth. When damages d increase, the investor
wants to hire more lawyers because he will receive a higher payo if he wins the case.
Replacing the expression for the demand for lawyers into the probability of conviction
gives the equilibrium probability of conviction:
X =
j
j + 1
(13)
This probability of conviction increases with judicial eciency j. It does not depend
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on damages d and on the wage w. This is driven by the symmetric number of lawyers. A
change in damages or in the wage modies the number of lawyers and thus of arguments
in the same way. The probability of conviction only depends on the relative number of
arguments presented by the two parties the two parties. As a consequence, the probability
of conviction is not aected by such changes. By contrast, a change in judicial eciency
j gives a higher weight to the case of one party and thus does aect the probability of
conviction.
3.3 Discussion
The litigation technology assumed so far is inecient because the parties could hire
less lawyers and still keep their expected benet from litigation constant. Set the demands
for lawyers to any arbitrarily small number and plug them in Equation (9). Then, the
solution in Equation (13) still holds. This ineciency arises because guilty entrepreneurs
are able to produce arguments in their favor even though they are guilty. This leads to a
wasteful contest. One way to make the litigation technology more ecient is to make it
less ecient for guilty entrepreneurs to produce arguments. This could be for technolog-
ical reasons, or because judges are more competent and thus better able to distinguish
between good and bad arguments. I model this feature by introducing a productivity
parameter  that enters the production function of arguments of the entrepreneur in the
following way:
E =  ln(le): (14)
Taking into account this dierence and solving the model as before, the probability of
convicting a guilty entrepreneur becomes:
X =
jli
jli + l

e :
(15)
If  = 1, we are back to the model described above. If  < 1, the productivity of the
entrepreneur in producing arguments diminishes and he presents less arguments in his
favor. At the extreme, when  = 0, the conviction rate only depends on the number of
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lawyers hired by the investor. There are no more ineciencies.
The rest of the paper focuses on the case  = 1, rst because this is consistent with
the literature on litigation and second because it makes the analysis tractable. The case
 = 0 also allows for analytical solutions, but boils down to a standard setting where the
only insight is that contract enforcement is good for the economy. The author conjectures
that all the following results hold providing  is high enough.
4 The Financial Contract
Anticipating the number of engineers ly and of lawyers le and li, investors and en-
trepreneurs sign nancial contracts specifying an amount to be lent k   s at an interest
rate r .
Investors only accept to lend if they get a positive prot. Because they compete with
each other by oering the most attractive contracts to entrepreneurs, they end up with
nothing. The expected prot of entrepreneurs is the sum of the repayment r(k  s) from
successful and rational entrepreneurs (a proportion (1   p) of them), of the expected
compensatory damages xd received from successful and optimistic entrepreneurs (the
remaining proportion p), and their opportunity cost of lending that is equal to the
return from storing k   s. This boils down to the following zero-prot condition:
(1  p)r(k   s) + pXd  pwli(w)  (k   s)  0: (16)
The contract ensures that entrepreneurs do not prefer opportunistic default. If this
constraint is not satised, no lending occurs as the participation constraint of investors
could not be satised. The expected damages to be paid in case of opportunistic default
should thus be greater than the cost of respecting the terms of the contract. This con-
strains the maximum return that can be asked to entrepreneurs and puts an upper bound
on the size of the loan. As a consequence, a higher quality of enforcement makes it pos-
sible to ask for a higher repayment. Because investors make zero prot in any case, this
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translates in a larger loan. This gives the following incentive compatibility constraint:
r(k   s)  Xd (17)
It can be shown that Equations (16) and (17) are binding. Combining these two
equations gives the optimal nancial contract:
k = s  pwli(w) + Xd (18)
r =
Xd
Xd  pwli(w) (19)
Equation (18) shows that the legal environment aects the size of rms k through
two channels. First, through the number of lawyers. When judicial eciency j increases,
the demand for lawyers shifts to the left as Equation (12) tells us. As a consequence,
the number of lawyers decreases for a given wage and the amount of capital tends to
decrease as well. If investors can reach the same quality of contract enforcement with
less lawyers, this relaxes their participation constraint and they are willing to lend more.
By contrast, when damages d increase, the demand for lawyers increases, see Equation
(12). A larger number of lawyers makes it more costly to enforce contracts and investors
respond by lending less. Second, the legal environment aects the size of projects through
the quality of enforcement Xd. When judicial eciency j or damages d increase, the
quality of contract enforcement increases as well. This relaxes the incentive compatibility
constraint of the investor and he is willing to lend more.
We now replace the number of lawyers by their analytical solutions given in Equation
(12). The nancial contract now looks like that:
k = s+
dj(1 + j   p2)
(j + 1)2
(20)
r =
1 + j
(1 + j   p2) (21)
Then the following result holds:
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Result 2 Higher judicial eciency j and higher damages d have a positive impact on
capital k.
Higher damages increase both the quality and the cost of enforcement. The model pre-
dicts, however, an unambiguous increase in lending. Higher judicial eciency decreases
the cost of enforcement and increases the quality of enforcement. Lending increases as a
result.
5 Economic Development
This section describes the two channels through which the legal environment aects
economic development: First, more capital benets the economy. Second, a larger de-
mand for lawyers makes it more costly to hire engineers and thus to produce.
Normalize the number of entrepreneurs and of investors to one. This implies that the
aggregate demands for engineers and lawyers are equal to the individual demands and
that L = 2. Then, the equilibrium wage is given by:
ly(w) + le(w) + li(w) = 2: (22)
Replacing the demands for engineers and lawyers from Equations (4) and (12) into
Equation (22) gives the equilibrium wage:
w =
B + Ak
2
; (23)
where B = pdj
(1+j)2
is a constant.
Higher judicial eciency j or lower damages d increase the parameter A and the
equilibrium wage w. This happens because these parameter changes shift the demand
for lawyers to the right. Because of the higher pressure on the labor market, the limited
supply of labor implies that the wage has to increase.
We get the following result:
Result 3 Higher judicial eciency j has a positive impact on economic development y
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while lower damages d have no impact.
According to Equation (5), production decreases with the wage (because 0 < 0) and
with capital. Then, higher judicial eciency increases production through both channels.
By contrast, higher damages both increase the capital and the wage, and thus have an
ambiguous impact on production. Doing the algebra shows that these two eects exactly
cancel out.
5.1 Limited Supply of Lawyers
In some countries, the supply of lawyers is limited. Law departments were inexistent in
Japan until recently for example or admission rates to the bar exam may be lowered. This
section studies the consequences of limiting the supply of lawyers on the economy. The
overall eect is not clear. First, a smaller number of lawyers should be benecial because
it reduces the ineciency of lawyers. An articially low number of lawyers, however,
works against the market forces and drives a wedge between the wage of lawyers and the
one of engineers. The cost of hiring lawyers increases and this harms the economy.
Constrain the supply of lawyers by an upper bound l. If l  le(w)+ li(w), the capacity
constraint on lawyers does not bind and we are back to the equilibrium previously de-
scribed. An increase in the capacity constraint on lawyers l has no impact on production.
If If l < le(w) + li(w), the equilibrium changes. Let wy be the wage of engineers and
wl the wage of lawyers. The supply of engineers is now L  l. The demand is still given
by Equation (4). The equilibrium wage of engineers is then given by:
wy =
2  l
Ak
(24)
The supply of lawyers is l. The demand for lawyers is the sum of the demands for
lawyers in Equation (12). The equilibrium wage of lawyers is given by:
wl =
pdj
l(j + 1)2
: (25)
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Then, the following result holds:
Result 4 An increase in the capacity constraint of lawyers l has a positive increase on
economic development y.
An increase in the capacity constraint of lawyers l increases the wage of engineers wy
and decreases the one of lawyers wl. From Equation 20, cheaper lawyers do not aect
capital. More expensive engineers, by contrast, decrease production.
5.2 Dynamics
This section describes the dynamics of the economy. We rst assume that a rst
generation of agents is endowed with an amount of capital k0. Young agents work as
lawyers or workers and save all their wage to consume it when they are old st = wt 1.
From Equation (20), the stock of capital becomes:
kt+1 = wt + C; (26)
where C = dj(1+j p
2)
(1+j)2
is a constant.
Combining this equation and the equilibrium wage from Equation (23) gives the law
of evolution of capital:
kt+1 = Akt +B + C; (27)
If the conditions A + C > 0 and B < 1 are satised, then the economy converges to
a stable steady state equilibrium kss such that:
kss =
B + C
1  A (28)
at the growth rate gt of capital given by:
gt  kt+1
kt
=
Akt +B + C
kt
: (29)
One can check that the condition A + C > 0 is satised. The further condition for
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the existence of a steady-state, B < 1, requires an assumption on a lower bound on the
size of the population ((1  )a)1= < 2.
Since the growth of output is an increasing function of g, the results above on eco-
nomic development apply also to economic growth. For example, higher judicial eciency
implies a larger growth rate of output along the convergence path. Along this path and
at the steady state, an economy with higher judicial eciency also produces more.
6 Some Empirical Evidence
The objective of this section is to see whether the predictions of the model are con-
sistent with the data. It presents new cross-country data on the number of lawyers per
capita. It then documents the relationship between various measures of judicial eciency
and the number of lawyers. Finally, it shows the relationships between the number of
lawyers and nancial and economic development.
6.1 Data
Table 2 gives summary statistics for some of the following variables.
Lawyers. I collected data on the number of lawyers per 10,000 inhabitants for 74
countries around 2004. The sample covers mostly OECD countries and a few more as
the data on the number of lawyers is more dicult to nd for poorer countries. There
only existed readily available data sets for Europe and the Americas. The European data
are compiled by the European Commission for the Eciency of Justice (CEPEJ). The
American data are compiled by the Justice Studies Center for the Americas (CEJA). For
the remaining countries, the data comes from their respective national bar associations
or law societies. The source and year for the number of lawyers of each country is given
in the Appendix. When no data was available for 2004, I chose the closest year with
available data. The average year of the sample is 2004.3 with a standard deviation of 2.1.
Figure 2 presents the number of lawyers per 10,000 inhabitants in dierent countries
around 2004. The gure shows that Israel has about 50 lawyers per 10,000 inhabitants
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whereas South Korea has a little bit more than 1. Almost the same gap exists between
the United States and Japan. The average number of lawyers per 10,000 inhabitants of
the whole sample is 13.7.
How to measure judicial eciency j? In the model, judicial eciency refers
to the productivity of judges. I use three variables that are likely to aect judicial
productivity: formalism of courts, accounting standards, and legal origins.
First, the rigidity of judicial procedures makes judges more constrained and thus
less productive. Djankov et al. (2003) collected data on the legal procedures to collect
a bounced check in court. I use their measure of legal formalism as a proxy for how
procedural the legal system is. A higher formalism entails higher costs and longer trials.
I normalize this variable between zero and one, where a higher value means a more formal
legal system. This variable covers 65 countries of the sample.
Second, higher accounting standards give a more accurate overview of the accounts of
a rm. As a consequence, judges are better able to justify their decision when accounting
standards are higher. I use a measure of accounting standards from the Center for
International Financial Analysis and Research. I normalize this variable between zero
and one, where a higher value means higher accounting standards. This variable only
covers 37 countries of the sample.
Third, I use data on the legal origin of a country from La Porta et al. (2008). There are
four legal origins in the sample: English common law, French civil law, German civil law,
and Scandinavian civil law. A good rule of thumb is to thinks of common law countries
as the United Kingdom and all its former colonies. Countries with a French legal origin
are France, Italy, Spain, Portugal and all their former colonies. Countries with a German
legal origin include Germany, Japan, South Korea and some East European countries.
Countries with a Scandinavian legal origin are Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and
Sweden. These data cover the whole sample. Almost half of the countries have a French
legal origin and almost one quarter are common law countries.
Legal origins dier in at least two dimensions of interest to us. First, judges have a
greater ability to make the law and are more bound by precedent in common law, German
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civil law, and Scandinavian civil law than in French civil law. Judges belonging to the
French civil law family should thus be less productive than elsewhere as they are are
more constrained by rigid civil codes. Second, the common law gives less investigative
powers to judges than to lawyers in common law compared to civil law. This regulation
constrains the productivity of judges in common law countries. Then, we should expect
less lawyers in German and Scandinavian civil law countries. This classication, however,
does not predict whether common law or French civil law countries have more lawyers.
See Merryman (1969) and Zweigert and Kotz (1998) for further details on the dierences
between legal origins.
Financial and economic development. I use real GDP per capita as a measure
of economic development from Heston et al. (2009). I average this variable over 2001-
2005 and 1980-1985 and take its logarithm. It covers all the sample in 2001-2005 and 61
out of 74 countries in 1980-1985. The data on the share of credit to GDP averaged over
2001-2005 comes from the World Bank. It covers 71 countries.
6.2 Legal Environment and Lawyers
How is the legal environment related to the number of lawyers? This section shows
OLS estimates of the number of lawyers on formalism of courts, accounting standards,
legal origins, and controlling for past GDP. The results are given in Table 3 and are
described below.
Countries that were richer in the 1980's have more lawyers in the 2000's. A one percent
increase in past income increases the number of lawyers by 0.6-1 percentage points.
The legal origin of a country can explain some of the variation in the number of
lawyers. The reference group is the set of countries with a German legal origin. The
table shows that this group has signicantly less lawyers than the French civil law and
common law groups. The number of lawyers in the German civil law group is not signif-
icantly dierent from the Scandinavian civil law group. Depending on the specication,
common law countries have between twice to three times more lawyers than the reference
group while French legal origin countries have 120 to 150 percent more. Both coecient
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estimates are signicant at the one percent level in all specications.
The higher number of lawyers in common law countries is not surprising because
of the adversarial nature of their trials that relies more heavily on lawyers than the
inquisitorial nature of civil law trials. A bit more surprising is the nding that French
civil law countries also have many lawyers. Latin American and Mediterranean countries
are representative of this feature. One important dierence between French civil law, on
the one hand, and German and Scandinavian civil law, on the other hand, concerns the
ability of judges to make the law and to rely less heavily on civil codes when making a
decision. This greater constraints imposed on French civil law judges seem to increase
drastically the number of lawyers.
The degree of formalism increases the number of lawyers. This is consistent with
the model and with the view that lawyers take advantage of the rigidities of the legal
system. The measure is normalized from 0 to 1, 0 being Venezuela and 1 being Hong
Kong. The coecient estimate predicts a 180 percent increase in the number of lawyers
if Hong Kong was to adopt the same degree of formalism as the legal system of Venezuela
and is signicant at the 1 percent level.
Lower accounting standards increase signicantly the number of lawyers. This is
consistent with the model and with the view that lawyers can aect the judgment in
their favor when standards are low. The measure is normalized from 0 to 1, 0 being
Uruguay and 1 being Sweden. The coecient estimate predicts a 220 percent in the
number of lawyers if Sweden was to adopt the accounting standards of Uruguay and is
signicant at the 1 percent level.
There exists a large variation in the number of lawyers per country, from 1 to 50
lawyers per 10,000 inhabitants. Japan, South Korea, or the very poor countries of the
sample like Nigeria or Kenya are the countries with the least lawyers while Israel, the
United States and many South American countries have the most lawyers. Up to 70 per-
cent of this variation can be explained by past income, legal origins, accounting standards,
and the formalism of judicial procedures.
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6.3 Lawyers, Finance, and the Economy
How is the number of lawyers related to nancial and economic development? This
section show the regressions of credit and GDP on the number of lawyers, formalism of
courts, and controlling for past GDP. There is a potential problem of reverse causality
because credit is likely to inuence the number of lawyers and vice versa. The OLS
estimator may give biased estimates of the parameters of interest. One solution is to use
an instrumental variable (IV). For this, we need to nd an instrument that inuences
the number of lawyers without aecting directly credit or GDP. The previous regressions
gave us a number of regressors that are correlated with the number of lawyers and that
are thus potential candidates. Legal origin is a good candidate because it is exogenous
(legal origins change very little over time) and it has been widely used in the literature
as an instrument. The results of the OLS and IV estimates are given in Table 4 and 5
and are described below.
The results suggest that a one percent increase in the number of lawyers reduces
credit by 0.10 to 0.26 percent and reduces GDP by 0.06 to 0.11 percent depending on
the specication. This is consistent with the belief that lawyers are harmful to growth.
It is also consistent with Murphy et al. (1991) who found a negative correlation between
the number of law graduates and economic growth. However, they do not address the
potential problem of reverse causality between the number of lawyers and growth. The
instrument, legal origin, partially addresses this concern. Table 3 can be interpreted as
the rst stage regressions of the IV estimation. The R2 in the rst-stage regression is quite
high and this rules out the problem of weak instruments. It is possible, however, that
the instrument is inconsistent. Although the literature has not yet settled the issue, legal
origin may have a direct impact on credit and GDP. The consistency of the instrument
is thus a potential problem and the results should be considered with caution.
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7 Conclusion
This paper introduced a model of litigation in a growth framework. The motivation
for doing this exercise was the apparent contradiction between the idea that lawyers are
harmful for the economy and the other idea that they are necessary to make litigation
and thus the enforcement of contracts work. The analysis showed that a large number of
lawyers can be the result of either low judicial eciency, high damages, or low restrictions
on the supply of lawyers. These environments do not benet the economy and are thus
consistent with a negative correlation between the number of lawyers and economic activ-
ity. The model also predicts that economies benet more from higher judicial eciency
than from tighter restrictions on the supply of lawyers or higher damages.
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Table 1: Data Source
CEJA stands for Centro de Estudios de Justicia de las Americas (Justice Studies Center
of the Americas). CEPEJ stands for Commission Europeenne pour l'Ecacite de la
Justice (The European Commission for the Eciency of Justice). The number of lawyers
is per 10,000 inhabitants. An interrogation mark \?" refers to a year that was not
explicitly specied but that could be inferred from the context, for example from the
date of a newsletter.
Country Lawyers Year Source
Albania 3.1 2008 CEPEJ
Argentina 34.0 2001 CEJA
Armenia 2.4 2008 CEPEJ
Austria 5.5 2004 CEPEJ
Belgium 12.2 2004 CEPEJ
Bulgaria 13.6 2004 CEPEJ
Bahamas, The 20.2 2000 CEJA
Bolivia 7.2 2004 CEJA
Brazil 26.4 2004 CEJA
Canada 22.0 2004 CEJA
Switzerland 9.5 2004 CEPEJ
Chile 12.6 2004 CEJA
Colombia 35.3 2004 CEJA
Cyprus 18.8 2004 CEPEJ
Czech Republic 8.7 2004 CEPEJ
Germany 16.1 2005 CEPEJ
Denmark 8.3 2004 CEPEJ
Ecuador 22.4 2004 CEJA
Spain 36.3 2004 CEPEJ
Estonia 3.2 2004 CEPEJ
Finland 3.2 2004 CEPEJ
France 6.5 2004 CEPEJ
United Kingdom 19.7 2004 CEPEJ
Georgia 8.0 2008 CEPEJ
Greece 31.7 2004 CEPEJ
Guatemala 6.7 2004 CEJA
Hong Kong 10.0 2009? Law Society of Hong Kong
Honduras 7.4 1998 CEJA
Croatia 5.7 2004 CEPEJ
Hungary 8.8 2004 CEPEJ
Ireland 3.7 2004 CEPEJ
Iceland 22.7 2004 CEPEJ
Israel 50.9 2007 Israel Bar Association
Italy 22.2 2004 CEPEJ
Jamaica 9.6 2000 CEJA
Jordan 14.7 2002 Jordan Bar Association
(Continued)
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Table 1 { Continued
Country Lawyers Year Source
Japan 1.6 2004 Japan Federation of Bar Associations
Kenya 1.7 2006 Law Society of Kenya
South Korea 1.3 2004 Korean Bar Association
Lithuania 3.8 2005 CEPEJ
Luxembourg 20.3 2004 CEPEJ
Latvia 3.6 2005 CEPEJ
Mexico 18.2 2004 CEJA
Macedonia 6.4 2004 CEPEJ
Malta 9.8 2008 CEPEJ
Montenegro 6.9 2007 CEPEJ
Malaysia 5.1 2004 The Malaysian Bar
Nigeria 3.8 2009? Nigeria Bar Association
Nicaragua 15.0 2001 CEJA
Netherlands, The 7.8 2004 CEPEJ
Norway 9.4 2004 CEPEJ
New Zealand 24.3 2004 New Zealand Law Society
Panama 23.5 2003 CEJA
Peru 25.3 2004 CEJA
Philippines 5.3 2009? Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Poland 2.0 2004 CEPEJ
Puerto Rico 29.0 2000 CEJA
Portugal 20.6 2004 CEPEJ
Paraguay 15.4 2002 CEJA
Romania 6.6 2004 CEPEJ
Singapore 7.9 2005 The Law Society of Singapore
El Salvador 12.1 2004 CEJA
Serbia 9.0 2007 CEPEJ
Slovak Republic 7.1 2004 CEPEJ
Slovenia 4.8 2004 CEPEJ
Sweden 4.6 2004 CEPEJ
Trinidad and Tobago 12.9 2004 CEJA
Turkey 6.2 2004 CEPEJ
Taiwan 1.8 2009? Taipei Bar Association
Ukraine 3.8 2004 CEPEJ
Uruguay 41.7 2004 CEJA
United States 36.5 2003 CEJA
Venezuela 41.9 2000 CEJA
South Africa 4.3 2007 Law Society of South Africa
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Figure 2: Number of lawyers per 10,000 inhabitants around 2004
Table 2: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Lawyers per 10,000 inhab. 13.7 11.3 1.3 50.9 74
Common law 0.22 0.41 0 1 74
French civil law 0.47 0.50 0 1 74
German civil law 0.24 0.43 0 1 74
Scandinavian civil law 0.07 0.25 0 1 74
Formalism 0.6 0.2 0 1 65
Accounting 0.6 0.2 0 1 37
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Table 3: Legal environment and the number of lawyers
Dependent variable: Log of lawyers per 10,000 inhabitants
Log GDP pc 1981-85 0.599*** 0.524*** 0.561** 0.888***
(0.000) (0.003) (0.023) (0.000)
Common law 0.966*** 2.079***
(0.002) (0.000)
French 1.470*** 1.193***
(0.000) (0.000)
Scandinavian 0.180 0.666*
(0.662) (0.079)
Formalism 1.749*** 1.824***
(0.001) (0.005)
Accounting standards -2.339*** -2.123***
(0.001) (0.001)
Constant -4.122*** -3.393** -1.458 -6.748***
(0.003) (0.047) (0.490) (0.000)
N 61 57 37 37
adj. R2 0.369 0.195 0.248 0.703
p-values in parentheses
* p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01
Table 4: Number of lawyers and credit
Dependent variable: Log of the ratio of credit to GDP averaged over 2001-2005
OLS
IV, with legal
origin
OLS
IV, with legal
origin
Log GDP pc 1981-85 0.905*** 0.927*** 0.777*** 0.757***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Lawyers -0.200** -0.268 -0.142 -0.101
(0.039) (0.115) (0.180) (0.568)
Formalism -0.766* -0.831*
(0.074) (0.088)
Constant -3.695*** -3.730*** -2.229* -2.102
(0.001) (0.001) (0.095) (0.136)
N 58 58 55 55
adj. R2 0.509 0.505 0.513 0.511
p-values in parentheses
* p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01
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Table 5: Number of lawyers and GDP
Dependent variable: Log of GDP per capita averaged over 2001-2005
OLS
IV, with legal
origin
OLS
IV, with legal
origin
Log GDP pc 1981-85 1.213*** 1.210*** 1.139*** 1.127***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Lawyers -0.117*** -0.109 -0.085** -0.063
(0.004) (0.100) (0.047) (0.360)
Formalism -0.313* -0.352*
(0.077) (0.080)
Constant -1.320*** -1.315*** -0.537 -0.461
(0.004) (0.004) (0.319) (0.419)
N 61 61 57 57
adj. R2 0.911 0.911 0.915 0.914
p-values in parentheses
* p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01
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